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Abstract—With the development of decentralized consensus
protocols, permissionless blockchains have been envisioned as
a promising enabler for the general-purpose transaction-driven,
autonomous systems. However, most of the prevalent blockchain
networks are built upon the consensus protocols under the
crypto-puzzle framework known as proof-of-work. Such proto-
cols face the inherent problem of transaction-processing bottle-
neck, as the networks achieve the decentralized consensus for
transaction confirmation at the cost of very high latency. In
this paper, we study the problem of consensus formation in a
system of multiple throughput-scalable blockchains with sharded
consensus. Specifically, the protocol design of sharded consensus
not only enables parallelizing the process of transaction validation
with sub-groups of processors, but also introduces the Byzantine
consensus protocols for accelerating the consensus processes.
By allowing different blockchains to impose different levels of
processing fees and to have different transaction-generating rate,
we aim to simulate the multi-service provision eco-systems based
on blockchains in real world. We focus on the dynamics of
blockchain-selection in the condition of a large population of con-
sensus processors. Hence, we model the evolution of blockchain
selection by the individual processors as an evolutionary game.
Both the theoretical and the numerical analysis are provided
regarding the evolutionary equilibria and the stability of the
processors’ strategies in a general case.
Index Terms—Permissionless blockchains, sharding, ELAS-
TICO, evolutionary game
I. INTRODUCTION
The past decade has witnessed the fast development of
the blockchain technologies, especially as the decentralized
immutable ledger database (i.e., cryptocurrencies) in the
FinTech sector. Most of the studies on blockchains have
been focused on the development in cryptocurrencies and
the related domains [1]. However, in recent years, more
focus about blockchain applications is also put upon the
domain of self-organization in general-purpose decentralized
systems [2]. Given the decentralized consensus achieved by
the blockchain network, smart contracts [3] are deployed
in the form of general-purpose scripts/functions and stored
on each consensus node (i.e., processor)1 in the network.
Following the order prescribed by the consensus about the
blockchain states, each smart contract is executed in a repli-
cated manner and thus guarantees to produce a uniform output
across the network. Thanks to the technical maturation of
smart contracts, blockchains are now envisioned as an enabler
for self-organization in wireless networks and decentralized
1We use the two terms, i.e., node and processor, interchangeably.
Service 
Providers
Service 
Hosting 
Peers
(Mobile) 
Clients
Blockchain
Registration and 
Service Negotiation
(1)
Data/Computation 
Offloading
(2)
Service Delivery
(3)
(4)
(6) (5)
Operations in the form of smart contract
Interactions between entities (including data flow)
Fig. 1. A generic framework of blockchain-based self-organization in a
service system of three parties. All the deals are settled in a sequence of
smart contracts: (1) service requesting by the clients, (2) access granting
by the providers, (3) requesting service hosting (e.g., auction for computa-
tion/storage/utility offloading) by the providers, (4) settlement of the hosting
requests, (5) delivery negotiation between hosting peers and clients and (6)
service completion and payment settlement upon proofs of delivery.
cyber-physical systems. More specifically, existing studies,
e.g., autonomous access control [4] and service provision [5],
employ blockchains as an integrator to channel the services
upon demands as well as audit the operations of different
parties in the system.
A generic paradigm for blockchain-based self-organization
in networking applications is described by Figure 1 from the
perspective of blockchain users. With the embedded cryp-
tographic functionalities (e.g., asymmetric keys [2]) and the
automated transactions based on smart contracts, blockchains
are ready to provide the overlaid/virtual channels of secured
data/service/payment delivery among trustless parties in the
system [2]. As illustrated in Figure 1, this is achieved by
encapsulating the controlling rules into smart contracts and
the data (e.g., control signals) into blockchain transactions. In
particular, when blockchain networks are implemented with
permissionless consensus protocols, it is possible to realize
the scheme of network management in a purely decentralized
manner. Furthermore, when the blockchain maintenance is
delegated to groups of nodes with dedicated storage and
computing power, we have the blockchain as a Platform as
a Service (PaaS) in a similar way to that in the context of
cloud computing.
Nevertheless, although permissionless blockchains provide
a promising approach to transaction-driven automation for
network control problems, most of the existing permis-
sionless consensus protocols are based on Proof-of-Work
(PoW) [1] and sacrifice the efficiency, i.e., transaction-
processing throughput, for a higher level of consensus se-
curity [2]. For example, the popular Ethereum network [6]
with a framework of Tuning-complete smart contracts can
only support less than 20 Transactions Per Second (TPS).
As a result, these blockchains cannot satisfy the low-latency
requirements in most of the networking applications and
services such as access handing-off between groups of road
side units in vehicular-to-infrastructure communication. To
guarantee controller response in milliseconds, throughput-
scalable protocols such as ELASTICO [7] are proposed to
support both open access as in permissionless networks and
low latency as in consortium distributed systems [8]. In brief,
the throughput-scalable blockchain networks adopt the PoW-
based crypto-puzzle design for node-identity verification and
the classical Byzantine Fault-Tolerant (BFT) protocols (e.g.,
practical BFT [9]) for distributed transaction ordering. Further-
more, the concept of sharding is adopted from the distributed
database [10] to enable the parallelization of transaction pro-
cessing. Thus, the blockchain network is able to increase the
TPS as the number of consensus processors increases.
In this paper, we investigate the scenario of general-purpose
PaaS based on permissionless blockchains using sharding-
based consensus protocols. In particular, we study the prob-
lem of consensus provision at the node level for multiple
blockchains. Noting that the decentralized processors in a
blockchain network are trustless, we assume that the pro-
cessors are rational (i.e., profit-driven) and non-malicious.
Namely, the independent and homogeneous processors partic-
ipate in the consensus processes of parallel blockchains and
dedicate their resources in exchange for the optimal consensus
rewards, i.e., the transaction fees collected from the clients.
For ease of exposition, we use the ELASTICO protocol [7]
to exemplify the approach of system analysis for consensus
participation. Without limiting the blockchains to any specific
service provision system, we essentially study a general case of
eco-system formation for self-organization with blockchains.
Then, by formulating the behaviors of consensus nodes as an
evolutionary game, we provide a series of analytical results
regarding the equilibrium states and their stability in the
evolution of the eco-system.
II. PRELIMINARIES OF SHARDED BLOCKCHAINS
A. Protocol Fundamentals of ELASTICO
Blockchain networks with sharding protocol partition the
processing processors inside into smaller BFT committees.
Each committee processes a disjoint set of transactions, which
is called shard here. Thus, the tasks of transaction process-
ing are divided into multiple groups and done in parallel.
Blockchains with shards overcome the fundamental scalability
limits of many popular blockchain systems, e.g., Bitcoin [10].
The transaction processing rate is able to scale almost linearly
with the number of processors in the network, which ensures
that the requirements of real-time resource-access management
systems can be met.
Now, we briefly introduce how ELASTICO [7] works.
ELASTICO proceeds in loosely-synchronized epochs, each of
which processes a set of transactions. According to [7], in each
epoch, one processor mainly executes 5 procedures:
1) The processor is first required to solve PoW puzzles
based on the concatenation of a public random seed, its
own public key and Internet protocol (IP) address. This
procedure allows other processors to verify the identity
of the processor. In addition, the processor is randomly
assigned to a committee based on the last few bits of its
PoW solution. For example, assuming a total number of
22 = 4 committees, if the last 2 bits of the PoW solution
is “01”, the processor will be assigned to committee 2
if this committee is not full. However, since the target
committee to assign to may be full, the processor may
need to solve more than one PoW puzzle.
2) Once a processor is accepted by the network and as-
signed to a committee, it will discover and establish
point-to-point connections with other committee peers
following an algorithm of decentralized randomness
generation described in [7, Section 3.3].
3) Then, an authenticated Byzantine agreement protocol,
e.g., practical BFT (PBFT) [9], is run within a committee
to agree on the set of transactions (i.e. shard) allocated to
it. Since different committees work in parallel, the net-
work latency only depends on the number of processors
in one committee rather than the entire network.
4) Once an agreement is reached in each committee, all the
results will be merged. Then, the final result is broadcast
to the network.
5) Finally, a scheme described in [7, Section 3.6] is exe-
cuted by a global committee to randomly generate a new
random seed for the next epoch.
B. Average Epoch Time for ELASTICO
As per the experimental results given by [7], the epoch time,
i.e., the duration of one epoch, is mainly dominated by two
parts, committee formation time and consensus time.
1) Average committee formation time: Committee forma-
tion time is the time used for randomly dividing processors
into different committees. This time is mainly due to the cost
of solving PoW puzzles. We assume that there are totally
n processors in the blockchain network. They are divided
into 2s committees, with a fixed number of c processors in
each committee. Thus, n = 2sc. As we mentioned previously,
one processor needs to solve more than one PoW puzzle if
the originally assigned committee is full. The problem of
calculating the total number of the required PoW solutions
is equivalent to the extended coupon collector problem [11].
The expected number of PoW solutions is given in [7, Section
10.1]. When c is fixed, it has a superlinear relationship with
n, which means that the expected number of PoW puzzles
solved by one processor is increasing with n. In other words,
when the number of processors per committee is fixed, if there
are more processors in the blockchain network, one processor
is expected to solve more PoW puzzles. In this paper, the
expected number of PoW puzzles solved per processor is
defined as a continuously differentiable and monotonically
increasing function of n, f(n), and we have f(0) = 0. Assume
that given a fixed puzzle difficulty, the average time for solving
one PoW puzzle is T . Then, the average committee formation
time can be expressed as Tf(n).
2) Average consensus time: The consensus time is deter-
mined by the intra-committee agreement for the given shard
and the inter-committee agreement for the final result. It is
mainly due to the network latency, which is usually caused
by the propagation delay of physical links, the forwarding
latency of gateways, and the queueing and processing delays
of intermediate nodes. In ELASTICO, we can observe that
most of communications among processors are limited within
the individual committees, so for a given committee size, the
time to reach consensus remains almost constant for different
network sizes. As [7, Figure 1] shows, the consensus requires
103 seconds for 400 processors and 110 seconds for 800
processors. Hence, we can think the consensus time is only
dependent on the committee size c, which is denoted by g(c).
C. Average Reward and Cost in ELASTICO
In this subsection, we quantitatively model the average
reward and cost of one processor per epoch in ELASTICO.
1) Average reward: The processor receives a payment
by adding new transaction records into the blockchain. We
assume that the transaction records are generated by the
users with a rate µ, and the price per transaction is set as
r. Thus, the average reward of one processor per epoch is
µr(Tf(n) + g(c))/n.
2) Average cost: The cost of one processor is dominated
by the energy used for solving PoW puzzles. We assume that
the cost of getting one PoW solution is ς on average. Thus,
the average cost of one processor per epoch is ςf(n).
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Payoff Functions
We consider N individual processors organizing themselves
into M blockchain networks built upon ELASTICO. That is,
the processors choose to participate in one of the blockchain
networks to receive their revenue. We assume that the pro-
cessors have identical computing power and the average time
for solving one PoW puzzle of fixed difficulty is T . We
also assume that all blockchain networks adopt the same
parameter of committee size c. We use the subscript i to denote
other parameters for the ith blockchain network. Without
loss of generality, the index of one blockchain network is
determined by µiri in a descending order. That is, µ1r1 ≥
· · · ≥ µMrM > 0. The vector of population fractions of the
blockchain networks is denoted by x = [x1, . . . , xM ]
⊤, where
[·]⊤ is the notation of transpose. Thus, x is in an (M − 1)-
simplex, i.e., X = {x ∈ RM+ :
∑M
i=i xi = 1}. We call x state
vector (or state) and X state space.
According to Section II, the expected payoff per unit time
(i.e., second) of a processor in the ith blockchain network can
be expressed as
ui(x) =
µiri(Tf(Nxi)+g(c))
Nxi+τ˜
− ςf(Nxi)
Tf(Nxi) + g(c)
, 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, (1)
where τ˜ > 0 can be regarded as the share taken by network
operators (e.g., the boosting nodes). By defining αi = µiri/N ,
τ = τ˜/N , and h(xi) = ςf(Nxi)/(Tf(Nxi) + g(c)), ui(x)
can be simplified as
ui(x) =
αi
xi + τ
− h(xi), 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. (2)
We can easily obtain that h(xi) is monotonically increasing
with xi and h(0) = 0.
B. Dynamical System Formulation
In this process, some processors may switch from one
blockchain network to another, causing a change of x. Since
the payoff of the processor is dependent on x, other proces-
sors may also adjust their choice of consensus participation
accordingly to choose new blockchain networks. Hence, in
this paper, we study population fractions of the blockchain
networks as a dynamical system. The state vector at time t
is denoted by x(t) = [x1(t), . . . , xM (t)]
⊤, and we define
x0 = x(0) as the initial state. At time t, the rate at which
the population fraction of ith blockchain network grows is
dxi(t)
dt
, and we define x˙(t) =
[
dx1(t)
dt
, . . . , dxM(t)
dt
]⊤
. We
assume that all the processors are bounded rational and self-
interested, so the forces regulating the state vector are from
the difference of payoffs. That is, the processors always switch
from a blockchain network with low payoff to one with high
payoff. Since the payoffs at time t are determined by x(t),
x˙(t) can be described by a function of x(t), here defined as
ϕ(·) : X → RM . Thus, this dynamical system is described by
the following ordinary differential equations (ODEs):
x˙(t) = ϕ(x(t)), ∀t ∈ R, i = 1, . . . ,M. (3)
Specially, we adopt the following replicator equations [12]:
ϕi(x) = xi (ui(x)− u¯(x)) , (4)
where u¯(x) =
∑M
i=1 xiui(x), which can be regarded as the
average payoff. Notice that here we ignore time t since ϕ(·)
is autonomous, that is, does not depend explicitly on time. We
can easily find
∑M
i=1 ϕi(x) = 0, so that if x0 ∈ X , we always
have x(t) ∈ X for any t ∈ R.
We are interested in how the vector of population fractions,
i.e., state vector, changes with time for different initial states.
Usually, it is described by a function ξ(·,x0) : T→ X , where
T is an open interval containing t = 0, such that ξ(0,x0) =
x0, and ∀t ∈ T,
d
dt
ξ(t,x0) = ϕ (ξ(t,x0)) . (5)
The function ξ(·,x0) is called a solution of (3).
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE GAME
A. Uniqueness of Solutions for Different Initial Points
In this subsection, we show that ∀x0 ∈ X , we have a
unique solution ξ(·,x0). It means that once the initial state
is determined, how the population fractions evolve over time
is totally determined. It is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. For ϕ(·) : X → RM described in (4) and ∀x0 ∈
X , the system (3) has a unique solution.
Proof. We can obtain that
∂ϕi(x)
∂xi
= (1− 2xi)
(
αi
xi + τ
− h(xi)
)
− (xi − x
2
i )
(
αi
(xi + τ)2
+
dh(x)
dx
∣∣∣∣
x=xi
)
−
M∑
j=1,j 6=i
xj
(
αj
xj + τ
− h(xj)
)
, (6)
∂ϕi(x)
∂xj
= −xi
(
αj
xj + τ
− h(xj)
)
+ xixj
(
αj
(xj + τ)2
+
dh(x)
dx
∣∣∣∣
x=xj
)
. (7)
(6) and (7) indicate that
∂ϕi(x)
∂xi
and
∂ϕi(x)
∂xj
exist and are
continuous in X . Hence, ϕ(x) is Lipschitz continuous in X .
By the Picard-Lindelo¨f theorem [12, Theorem 6.1], we obtain
Theorem 1.
B. Existence of Equilibria
Mathematically, an equilibrium (a.k.a., rest point or critical
point) under a solution mapping ξ is a state vector x ∈ X
such that ξ(t,x) = x for all t ∈ R [12, Definition 6.4]. In our
model, it means that if the vector of population fractions is
at an equilibrium, this population distribution will remain the
same, which implies that there are no “job-hoppings” in the
blockchain networks. In addition, according to [12, Proposition
6.3], if the vector of population fractions finally converges over
time, it will converge to an equilibrium.
Now, we are ready to give all the possible equilibria.
Based on whether there are any processor, we can divide the
considered blockchain networks into two specific sets, i.e.,
the working blockchain set W = {i : xi > 0} and the
resting blockchain set W¯ = {i : xi = 0}. A state is an
equilibrium if and only if ϕ(x) vanishes at this state. For
a given W = {i1, . . . , i|W|}, it means that
ui1(x) = · · · = ui|W|(x). (8)
Theoretically, there are totally 2M − 1 possible W . However,
for some values of W , there may not be any equilibria.
Now we give the conditions that a given W has at least one
equilibrium.
Consider a field K = {(a, b) : a, b > 0, a1+τ − h(1) ≤ b ≤
a
τ
} ⊂ R2, and a function K(·) : K → [0, 1] such that K(aˆ, bˆ)
is the solution for the equation
aˆ
x+ τ
− h(x) = bˆ. (9)
Notice that when K(aˆ, bˆ) is continuous and monotonically
increasing with aˆ and decreasing with bˆ. Then, we give the
following theorem.
Theorem 2. For a given set of working blockchains
W = {i1, . . . , i|W|}, if
αi1
1+τ − h(1) <
αi|W|
τ
and∑|W|−1
j=1 K
(
αij ,
αi|W|
τ
)
< 1, a unique equilibrium exists.
Otherwise, there is no equilibrium.
Proof. First, we show if
αi1
1+τ − h(1) <
αi|W|
τ
and∑|W|−1
j=1 K
(
αij ,
αi|W|
τ
)
< 1, a unique equilibrium exists.
Since αi1 ≥ · · · ≥ αi|W| , if
αi1
1+τ − h(1) <
αi|W|
τ
, we must
have
(
αij ,
αi|W|
τ
)
∈ K, j = 1, . . . , |W| − 1, and
0 ≤ K
(
αij ,
αi|W|
τ
)
< 1, j = 1, . . . , |W| − 1. (10)
Notice that K
(
αi|W| ,
αi|W|
τ
)
= 0. In addition, since for j =
2, . . . , |W|,
αij
1 + τ
− h(1) ≤
αi1
1 + τ
− h(1) <
αi|W|
τ
≤
αij
τ
, (11)
we have
0 < K
(
αij ,
αi1
1 + τ
− h(1)
)
≤ 1, j = 2, . . . , |W|. (12)
Obviously the following holds
K
(
αi1 ,
αi1
1 + τ
− h(1)
)
= 1. (13)
Thus,
|W|∑
j=1
K
(
αij ,
αi1
1 + τ
− h(1)
)
> 1. (14)
Since
∑|W|
j=1 K
(
αij ,
αi|W|
τ
)
< 1 and K(aˆ, bˆ) is continuous
and monotonically decreasing with bˆ, there must exist a unique
b¯ ∈
(
αi1
1+τ − h(1),
αi|W|
τ
)
such that
|W|∑
j=1
K
(
αij , b¯
)
= 1, (15)
and the population fraction of the ijth blockchain network is
indeed K
(
αij , b¯
)
.
When
αi1
1+τ − h(1) ≥
αi|W|
τ
. ∀xi1 , xi|W| ∈ (0, 1], we can
easily obtain that
αi|W|
xi|W| + τ
− h
(
xi|W|
)
<
αi|W|
τ
≤
αi1
1 + τ
− h(1) ≤
αi1
xi1 + τ
− h(xi1 ). (16)
Hence, there are no equilibria in this case.
Finally, it is obvious that when
αi1
1+τ − h(1) <
αi|W|
τ
and∑|W|−1
j=1 K
(
αij ,
αi|W|
τ
)
≥ 1, ui1(x) = · · · = ui|W|(x) > 0
will lead to
∑|W|
j=1 xij > 1. Hence, there are no equilibria in
this case.
C. Asymptotic Stability of the Equilibria
Among all the equilibria, we are especially interested in
those which are “robust”. That means, all sufficiently small
perturbations of the equilibrium induce a backward movement.
The mathematical definition of asymptotic stability in a dy-
namical system can be found in [12, Definitionn 6.5].
We assume that x∗ is an equilibrium and let Jϕ
x
∗ be the
M ×M Jacobian matrix of ϕ(·) at the state x∗. Then, Jϕ
x
∗
can be expressed as
Jϕ
x
∗ =


∂ϕ1(x)
∂x1
∂ϕ1(x)
∂x2
. . . ∂ϕ1(x)
∂xM
∂ϕ2(x)
∂x1
∂ϕ2(x)
∂x2
. . . ∂ϕ2(x)
∂xM
...
...
. . .
...
∂ϕM (x)
∂x1
∂ϕM(x)
∂x2
. . . ∂ϕM(x)
∂xM


∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
x=x∗
, (17)
where
∂ϕi(x)
∂xi
and
∂ϕi(x)
∂xj
, j 6= i are given in (6) and
(7), respectively. According to [13, Theorem 8.4.3], x∗ is
asymptotically stable if the real part of every eigenvalue of
Jϕ
x
∗ is negative, and it is unstable if any eigenvalue of J
ϕ
x
∗
has a positive real part. Based on our observations of Jϕ
x
∗ , we
can obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 1. For a given set of working blockchains W =
{i1, . . . , i|W|} and its corresponding equilibrium x
∗
W , ∀k ∈
W¯ , λk =
αk
τ
−
αi|W|
xi|W|+τ
+ h
(
xi|W|
)
is one eigenvalue of Jϕ
x
∗ .
Proof. From (6) and (7), we can obtain that ∀k ∈ W¯,
∂ϕk(x)
∂xk
∣∣∣∣
xk=0
=
αk
τ
−
M∑
j=1,j 6=k
xj
(
αj
xj + τ
− h(xj)
)
=
αk
τ
−
(
αi|W|
xi|W| + τ
− h
(
xi|W|
))
= λk. (18)
In addition, when xk = 0, ∀k˜ 6= k, we have
∂ϕk(x)
∂xk˜
= 0. (19)
We can observe that the matrix Jϕ
x
∗
W
− λkIM×M has its
elements of kth row all equal to 0, where IM×M is the
M ×M identity matrix. Thus, det
(
Jϕ
x
∗
W
− λkIM×M
)
= 0,
where det(·) is the determinant. Hence, λk is an eigenvalue
of Jϕ
x
∗
W
.
Based on the Lemma 1, we can further obtain Theorems 3.
Theorem 3. For a given set of working blockchains W =
{i1, . . . , i|W|} and its corresponding equilibrium x
∗
W , if ∃k ∈
W¯ , and λk ≥ 0, this equilibrium is not asymptotically stable.
Proof. From Lemma 1, we know that λk is an eigenvalue of
Jϕ
x
∗
W
. According to [13, Theorem 8.4.3], Jϕ
x
∗
W
has at least one
non-negative eigenvalue, so x∗W is not asymptotically stable.
Then, we can obtain the following corollaries.
Corollary 1. A set of working blockchains W =
{i1, . . . , i|W|} with |W| = w has a corresponding equilibrium.
If W 6= [1, w]∩N, this equilibrium is not asymptotically stable.
Proof. Since W 6= [1, w] ∩ N, there must exist a positive
integer l such that l ≤ w and l ∈ W¯ . Clearly, λl ≥ 0.
According to Theorem 3, we have this corollary.
Corollary 2. If the set of working blockchains [1, w]∩N has a
corresponding equilibrium, for any positive integer r such that
r < w, the set of working blockchains [1, r] ∩ N must have a
corresponding equilibrium, which is not asymptotically stable.
Proof. It is easy to obtain
α1
1 + τ
− h(1) <
αw
τ
≤
αr
τ
, (20)
and
r−1∑
j=1
K
(
αj ,
αr
τ
)
≤
r−1∑
j=1
K
(
αj ,
αw
τ
)
≤
w−1∑
j=1
K
(
αj ,
αw
τ
)
< 1. (21)
Hence, according to Theorem 2, the set of working
blockchains [1, r] ∩ N must have an equilibrium.
We denote this equilibrium by x∗[1,r]∩N, with Jaco-
bian matrix Jϕ
x
∗
[1,r]∩N
. Let
∑r
j=1 K(αj , b¯r) = 1 and∑w
j=1 K(αj , b¯w) = 1. Clearly, b¯r < b¯w. Since w /∈ [1, r]∩N,
according to Lemma 1, αw
τ
− b¯r is an eigenvalue of J
ϕ
x
∗
[1,r]∩N
.
Since αw
τ
> b¯w > b¯r, according to Theorem 3, x
∗
[1,r]∩N is not
asymptotically stable.
Theorem 4. Let w∗ = max{w : α11+τ − h(1) <
αw
τ
,
∑w−1
j=1 K
(
αj ,
αw
τ
)
< 1}. Then, only the corresponding
equilibrium of the set of working blockchains [1, w∗] ∩N has
probability to be asymptotically stable.
Proof. According to Corollaries 1 and 2, all the other equilib-
ria are not asymptotically stable. Then, we must have Theorem
4.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we provide the numerical analysis of the pop-
ulation dynamics of ELASTICO. We assume four blockchain
networks, for which α1 = 0.7, α2 = 0.5, α3 = 0.3, and
α4 = 0.1. In addition, we set τ = 0.01 and h(x) = ln(1+x).
In this condition, from our analysis in Section IV-B, we
can easily obtain xe1 = [0.4225, 0.3148, 0.1975, 0.0652]
⊤
and xe2 = [0.4499, 0.3369, 0.2132, 0]
⊤ are two equilibria.
By calculating the eigenvalues of Jacobian matrix of ϕ(·) at
the state xe1, we can find that xe1 is asymptotically stable.
Meanwhile, according to Corollary 2, we can see that xe2 is
not asymptotically stable.
We show the population dynamics from an initial point
x0 = [0.4498, 0.3369, 0.2132, 0.001]
⊤, which is a very small
deviation from xe2. From Figure 2, we can observe that, in-
stead of moving backward to its neighboring equilibrium xe2,
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Fig. 2. The population dynamics for four blockchain networks, from the
initial point x0 = [0.4498, 0.3369, 0.2132, 0.001]⊤ .
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Fig. 3. The payoff dynamics for four blockchain networks, from the initial
point x0 = [0.4498, 0.3369, 0.2132, 0.001]⊤.
the state moves away from this area and settles down over time
toward the new equilibrium xe1. This observation coincides
with our analysis given in the previous paragraph. Then, in
Figure 3, we show the dynamics of payoff for each blockchain
network. We can observe that at the beginning, since there are
only a few processors in the fourth blockchain, the payoff
per second of one processor is much higher than other three
blockchains. However, as more and more processors move to
the fourth blockchain, the payoff for the fourth blockchain
decreases while those for the other three blockchains increase.
Finally, they reach an equilibrium and all the blockchains have
the same expected payoff.
Finally, we show how the asymptotically stable equilibrium
changes with the prices. We set α1 = 0.7κ, α2 = 0.5κ, α3 =
0.3κ, and α4 = 0.1κ, where κ varies from 0.5 to 1.5. Figure 4
shows that, as the prices increase, the population fractions of
blockchain networks with higher prices increase while those
of blockchain networks with lower prices decrease.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have investigated the process of eco-system
formation for a large population of consensus nodes to join
one consensus process from multiple permissionless, sharded
blockchains. In particular, we have considered the scenario of
multiple blockchains adopting the ELASTICO protocol, which
combines the proof-of-work puzzle and the Byzantine fault-
tolerant agreement protocol to achieve both open access and
low transaction-processing latency. We have considered a gen-
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Fig. 4. The asymptotically stable equilibrium for α1 = 0.7κ, α2 = 0.5κ,
α3 = 0.3κ, and α4 = 0.1κ, where κ changes from 0.5 to 1.5.
eral scenario where different blockchains may provide differ-
ent transaction fees and have different transaction-generating
rates. We have studied the blockchain-selection behaviors
of the independent, bounded-rational consensus nodes with
identical computational power. The behaviors of blockchain
selection by the consensus nodes have been formulated as
an evolutionary game based on replicator dynamics. We have
provided a series of analytical and numerical results, which
reveal the consensus-formation mechanism in a permissionless
network of blockchains for multiple service provision.
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